Historians of ancient Christianity derive a certain satisfaction from the fact that Athanasius of Alexandria, the fervent architect of Nicene Christianity, should also be the first known ecclesiastical authority to "list precisely the twenty-seven books that eventually formed the generally accepted canon of the New Testament."' This intersection of canon and creed abets the notion that Christianity matured and solidified in the latter half of the fourth century;2 henceforth heresy and 
This is not to suggest that Athanasius is the first
Athanasius's own bias and assume that where extracanonical reading begins, so too does self-conscious deviation from orthodox norms.12 Yet, as Chartier reminds us, "We must also keep in mind that reading is always a practice embodied in acts, spaces, and habits."' Athanasius's Festal Epistle (much like his dogmatic writings on Nicene orthodoxy) attempts a double assertion of power that needs to be recognized: on the one hand, the institution of an order of books that is definitive, authoritative, and closed; on the other hand, the masking of his own agency in the institution of that order. As I shall outline below, Athanasius's own "embodiment" in reading vanishes within his order of books. The orthodox canon as imagined at the end of the fourth century, I suggest, sought the delimitation and control of Christian reading practices (and thus of Christian identity) through gestures of power that, once effective, were simultaneously obscured.
Such gestures of power are most evident at points of resistance; to understand better the institutional deployment of the Christian canon in late antiquity, therefore, I propose taking seriously one such extant resistant text: the Liber defide et de apocryphis, most likely authored by the condemned Spanish heretic, Priscillian.4 I want, for the moment, to read Priscillian's treatise as the work of a professed "orthodox" Christian of the late fourth century: one who acknowledges an inspired canon of scripture, who fears the same heretics as the other orthodox, who unswervingly follows the creed of the holy and apostolic church, but also-as an orthodox Christian-defends the reading and interpretation of extracanonical texts called apocrypha. I approach Priscillian's defense of apocrypha in this way not in order to provide a defense or justification of Priscillian and his followers; I am not simply "enamored" of an ancient heretic, practicing "historical advocacy" at the expense of "even-handed" history. something was "found in Scripture" that was not, in fact, to be found in the Septuagint.'7For Jerome, the answer lay in the confusion of translation efforts carried out over centuries, from Hebrew (lingua Domini nostri), to Greek, to (preHieronymian) Latin. By unraveling this linguistic mess, the answers can be found within the canon of scripture since, as Jerome casually remarked, "the church does not recognize apocrypha."'8
By the last decades of the fourth century, however, the status of "apocrypha" was much less clear than this offhand remark, or than the vitriolic Festal Epistle 39 of Athanasius, might suggest.'9 Jerome himself cannot seem to decide from one project to the next whether the label apocrypha, the acknowledgment of noncanonical status, necessarily determines the inutility of the text in question.20 His contemporary and rival Rufinus describes libri apocryphi as those Christian books that were neither canonical, "from which [the Fathers] wish that we derive the assertions of our faith," nor ecclesiastical, "which they wish to be read in churches, however not appealed to as an authority for the confirmation of faith. we can speak about the apocrypha only in so far as we speak about the canon of scripture" (p. 23), and "the apocrypha arose in an environment that was a combination of religious enthusiasm and pious curiosity" (p. 277).
20See for instance De viris illustribus 6 (TU 14.1:11) on the Epistle of Barnabas, which, according to Jerome, is "reckoned among the apocryphal scriptures (apocryphas scripturas)"; nevertheless, he does not seem to indicate that the writing is a forgery, and accepts that Barnabas wrote it "for the edification of the church." 2'Rufinus, Expositio symboli 36-38 (CChr ser. lat. 20:171-72). Rufinus did not see fit to introduce these terms as translations of Eusebius's o6pooyoupEva, &vTiAEyopEva, and v60a (see above, n. 4), using instead "a nonnullis dubitatum," "ostenditur," and "quam maxime dubitatur" (GCS 9.1:251-53).
22See Bruce M. Metzger, The Canon of the New Testament: Its Origin, Development, and Significance (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) 165: "The term [apocrypha] originally had an honourable significance as well as a derogatory one, depending on those who made use of the word." By citing such doctors of the church as Jerome and Augustine in a footnote (n. 2), Metzger implicitly (and unnecessarily) suggests that such evaluations might divide along lines of orthodoxy and heresy. had nonetheless been prescribed "by the fathers for instruction in the discourse of piety."23 He thus divides Christian literature into three conceptual piles: the books that are "canonized," those that are only "read" (such as Tobit or the Didache), and apocrypha.24 Throughout the argument of the Epistle, however, the middle category tends to slip away, leaving a rough equation between those books that are "not canonized" and the "apocrypha." In Festal Epistle 39 he is more insistent that those books that he designates as apocrypha are "the conception of heretics," and that they are "filled with myths... [and] Athanasius engages in complex and aggressive interpretation of scripture; at no point, however, does he need to defend his own method or basis for this interpretive execution. The "teaching" he transmits to his fellow Christians (as often as not against heretical "others") is already "there"; he is merely an exegetical "instrument" in the hands of the "true Teacher."37 In the end it is precisely the Athanasian vision of God, church, and scripture that acquires normative status through an impersonalized order of books. His exegetical sleight-of-hand is persuasive precisely because he has managed to erase his own interpretive agency: "Power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms."38 If we understand biblical exegesis as an "exercise of power," we begin to appreciate the efficacy of Athanasius's faceless power as wielded from within a stabilized and normative "order of books."
Brakke points out that "Athanasius's attempt to establish a closed canon of Christian scriptures in fourth-century Egypt... was even more a conflict among authoritative persons and the social institutions and practices that surrounded them, which included scripture."39 As I have suggested, however, it was more specifically the rearticulation of the conflict not as one between "authoritative persons" and their respective "institutions," but between "persons" who merely claim authority and the "institutions" which possess it in fact. Yet we must also note that "Athanasius's Festal Letter, far from being the decisive climax, was merely a signal moment in an ongoing process of Christian self-definition." This sociological explanation suffers, however, under the weight of some of the details of the controversy surrounding Priscillian. The most obvious obstacle is the fact that, before his condemnation (and in the midst of conflict with Spanish bishops), Priscillian accepted ordination as bishop of Avila; in Weberian terms, he moved unproblematically from the position of "prophet" to "priest," without noticeably altering his notions of Christian authority and identity. That is, he was not simply "routinized" by his opponents and made into an institutional mouthpiece.46Priscillian did not object to clerical interests; he merely wished to make explicit his own criteria of individual sanctity. More important to our interests here, however, is the fact that Priscillian does not contest the notion of a canon at any time, nor is he attempting to introduce "undesirable additions" into that canon. In fact, his argument for the utility of apocryphal texts is fundamentally undergirded by the existence of a divinely inspired corpus of canonical Christian books.47 It cannot thus be argued that institutional clerics such as Athanasius were merely "shutting the gates" against the indiscriminate literary tastes of their opponents (even if they themselves did proffer such an argument). Priscillian's defense of apocryphal reading comes out of a context no less cognizant of clerical or canonical authority than Athanasius's condemnation. "What is essential is thus to understand how the same texts can be differently apprehended, manipulated, and comprehended. have been said or done, either by God or by the apostles, so that it might be approved, concerning this it has been written: "Yes is yes, no is no" [Matt 5:37]. Moreover, that which has been found anew by intellects and trickeries is here opposed to the witness of divine virtue, which says, "That which surpasses this is from the Evil one."50 Although Virginia Burrus has suggested that these lines should be read as part of Priscillian's own argument,5 I find it more likely that here, as elsewhere in the tractate, he is caricaturing the position assumed by his opponents.52 Here we seem to have the gist of the accusation against which Priscillian defends his faith and his reading practice: that the defining feature of the canon is fixity (to this end Matt 5:37 is deployed with some finesse), and breaching this fixed border constitutes arrogance, overweening "erudition," and, in short, heresy. Priscillian's unnamed opponents might as well have cited Athanasius's own Festal Epistle.53 Heresy and apocrypha intersect at that point where the individual interpreter, relying foolishly on his (or her) own "erudition," goes beyond the scriptural norms of ecclesiastical truth.
Priscillian Although it may be read in the canon that the covenant was burned, it is not read in the canon that it was rewritten by Ezra. Nevertheless, since after the covenant was burned it could not have been restored unless it was written down, we correctly put faith in that book which claims Ezra as its author. Even if it is not established in the canon, it should be retained for the praise of the restored divine covenant with veneration appropriate to these matters.65 63Priscillian Liber de fide 47.19-21: "si quis ille est inter huiusmodi qui ista damnaverint, os suum claudat aut certa historiam factae rei proferens picturis se dicat credere vel poetis." 64Ibid., 51.13. 65Ibid., 52.13-18: "quamvis incensum testamentum legatur in canone, rescriptum ab Hesdra in canone non legitur, tamen, quia post incensum testamentum reddi non potuit nisi fuisset scribtum, recte illi libro fidem damus, qui Hesdra auctore prolatus, esti in canone non ponitur, ad elogium redditi divini testamenti digna rerum veneratione retinetur." To be fair to his opponents, the "canonical" accounts of the burning of Jerusalem by the Babylonians (2 Kgs 25:9; 2 Chr 36:19) do not specifically mention that the testimonium was burned. The book "claiming" Ezra is 4 Esdras (Vg), and the restoration of the covenant is found at 4 Esd 14.43. 66This malleable prooftext could make the exact opposite point for Athanasius, namely, that religious truth can be found only by "searching the scriptures": Athanasius Festal Epistle to noncanonical texts within the canon as authoritative sources for salvation history. He points out the "torrent" of passages in the books of Chronicles, referring to the books of "Nathan the prophet, Ahijah the Selonite, the visions of Iddo, the words of Jehu son of Hanani," and others.67 Since Priscillian readily grants to his opponents that every word of the canon has been inspired directly by God, in the face of these intracanonical directions to look outside the canon he archly comments, "I must either affirm that the prophet has invented what God has said, or that God has lied." inseruit, ut, nisi sub cauto messore, cum zezaniis frux periret et bona faceret occidere cum pessimis, una sententia adstringens eum qui pessima cum bonis iungit quam qui bona cum malis perdit." The devil, too, was responsible for the burning of the covenant rectified by Ezra (see above, n. 65): it is likely that this "diabolical" anti-textuality is meant to reflect back on Priscillian's opponents. 74See also ibid., 49.29-50.5: "Indeed, we cannot say that God has not said what the apostle has said he has said, nor that the prophet made no prophecy about which the scripture testifies. And since we correctly believe these things according to faith, we do not look at these texts in the canon and therefore, if everything outside the canon is to be condemned, either the testimony of the condemned is received or else there is no authority in the these things written in the scriptures." ("Non enim possumus dicere deum non dixisse quod eum dixisse apostolus dixit aut non prophetatum fuisse quod scribtura profetas dixisse testatur. Et cum haec recte ad fidem credimus, scribta haec in canonem non videmus et ideo, si extra canonem tota damnanda sunt aut qualiter vel damnatorum testimonium recipitur, vel in his quae scribta sunt scribentis auctoritas non tenetur. is not so much an institutional reliance on the surety of the ordered canon, but rather a "careful harvester" (cautus messor), that is, a perceptive reader.
The unquestioning acceptance of and belief in the orthodox Christian creed seems to be Priscillian's first mark of a "careful harvester" of apocryphal truths. The selection process must be guided by the pure heart formed by the Christian creed, not by insidious argumentation:
It is not possible for one thing to be selected and another rejected, as if choosing from delicacies at a banquet! Nor is it a question of clever reasoning, whereby someone has assumed that which follows: while they make a pretense of the dialectical work of intellects, they end up making sects through persuasion. The Scripture of God is a solid matter, a true matter, not to be chosen by a person but transmitted to that person by God.... From this arise heresies: when each individual serves his own intellect rather than God, and is not disposed to follow the creed but rather to argue over the creed .... Indeed, the creed is the seal [signatura] of the true matter, and to schematize [designare] the creed is to prefer to argue over the creed rather than to believe in it.77
Priscillian thus creates a tight link between scripture (res vera) and the creed (signatura rei verae): both must be accepted rather than disputed. To value disputation over confession produces dissent and, ultimately, heresy. He follows with his own fairly simple credal formulation, heavily emphasizing apostolic tradition and the dangers of heretical speculation: The inclusion of credal affirmations in apologetic works was not uncommon in this period of Christian controversies.9 Priscillian's creed, while hardly ranging into theological sophistication,80 allows him to claim all of those points of doctrinal orthodoxy that his anti-apocryphal enemies might have denied him: affirmation of a unified and apostolic faith centered on the oneness of God and the Trinity, irrespective of reading practices. Yet we also begin to see how Priscillian's understanding of Christian reading practice diverges from Athanasius's: by adding the individual confession (albeit of a communal creed) to absolute canonicity as a criterion for appropriate exegesis, Priscillian has begun to move away from a faceless, nonindividual sphere of interpretive authority into the careful delimitation of personal criteria that make up the fitting Christian exegete, the cautus messor. Athanasius, on the other hand, presumed that the scriptures themselves produced doctrinal truth within the orthodox reader by the very nature of their inspired unity.81
The Reader Reappears Perhaps the most significant trait of Priscillian's cautus messor is hinted at in the beginning of the treatise, when he describes Jesus Christ as "the master of our conduct and life."82 In defending his own ability to read apocryphal books, and so implicitly constructing individual authority for the interpretation of scripture and orthodoxy, Priscillian's life conducted according to apostolica dicta looms large. When he admits that the devil (through heretics) has inserted non-Christian ideas and phrases into noncanonical texts, he relies on individual sanctity to organize the editorial process: "In all these books [that is, the apocrypha] there is no fearif some things have been inserted by miserable heretics-in deleting and in agreeing to reject that which is not found in the prophets and evangelists. Indeed, for that very saint of God a lie is not embraced by the truth, nor are sacrilegious and hateful things set before the saints."83Canonical correspondence ("the prophets unum se credi voluit non divisum." Priscillian seems to have invented the heresiological label "Binionite," to contrast his opponents' hyperdivisional Trinitarian doctrine with his own "unionite" theology; see Chadwick, Priscillian, 87-88. and evangelists") remains the standard of verification, but the personal guarantee of the interpreter's holiness is the most reliable control against heretical interpolations. Furthermore, he points out that the individual sanctity that safeguards his apocryphal reading is not derived from the "novelty of intellect":84 "I cannot say that which I am compelled to speak, that, in my case, following the apostle was not the learnedness of faith, but rather the trap of one deceived."85 The "intellect" that his accusers portray as heretical Priscillian defends as eminently apostolic, as eruditio fidei; it is their sluggishness, "seeking leisure rather than toil," which should be condemned.86
Priscillian's criterion of individual holiness and apostolicity also makes evident the stratification of readers in the Christian community. He admits that not all Christians should read the potentially dangerous texts found outside the canon. When books are "communicated to ignorant ears," the hearers might end up "rushing into the pit of heretical falsehood: for they do not maintain the discipline of apostolic speech to its fullest."87 Priscillian, an educated Christian of strong ascetic proclivities, imagines that he lives the apostolic life "to its fullest" (ad plenum).8 He is a "servus domini considerans,"89 a servant of the Lord engaged in contemplation of the mysteries of the Godhead through the interpretation of scripture and the use of various extracanonical texts that might also speak of God.90 He is willing to take responsibility, to claim agency, in his biblical exegesis:
We want you to be confident that we have spoken previously out of surety. 89Priscillian Liber de fide 56.25. 90Priscillian also seems to be operating under a highly textualized understanding of the transmission of truth that he opposes to the diabolical "antitextuality" of his opponents (see above, n. 73); see ibid., 53.15-18: "Divine speech was indeed not able (since everything it had said belonged to it) when speaking about itself to speak a text about another, but only to report about itself; saying there that 'it is written' necessarily offers a responsible basis for our who prophesy. It is not fear, it is faith, because we have cherished that which is better and have rejected that which is worse.91
Priscillian's first-person assertions fly in the face of the carefully constructed and impersonal order of books devised by such ecclesiastical authorities as Athanasius. The fiction that only such a meticulously guarded order of books can withstand the brutal assault of the heretics and their apocryphal myths is unmasked and even inverted by Priscillian's individually sanctioned reading:
Since through such books (which diligence has kept outside the order of canonical books for the task of reading and which are held aside for the confirmation of those texts we read in the canon), the greater part of heretical sensibilities, waging war against the Catholics, showed that they prefer to falsify rather than hold true, in this way we might uphold that apostolic sentence by the law that "every spirit that denies Jesus is not from God, and Nor do they believe to be true those very same things which they lay out before those people who are strangers to their sect; otherwise they might seem to be Catholic, and not far off from the truth, for even in the apocryphal Scripture they discover Catholic meanings, or at least they seem to want to do so. But when they are among their own they think other things, and among their own they teach and learn things which they do not dare put forth, since they are blasphemous and hateful. Nevertheless they preach to those who honor the Catholic faith that which they do not hold, but under which they hide. Perhaps it is possible to find heretics who are more impure [immundiores], but no one compares to them in falsehood [fallacia] .99
Their very proximity to Catholic teaching, ensured by their own "cleverness" and derived from apocryphal scriptures, suggests to Augustine that they must simply be liars: former Priscillianists, "now liberated," recall the oath, "Swear, perjure, but do not hand over the secret."'1? Otherwise, if orthodox truths could be derived from apocrypha, the entire order of books would collapse. More important than Augustine's accusation of the inherent falsity of the Priscillianists is his explanation of why they append apocryphal reading to the orthodox canon in the first place. Jerome, at the beginning of the fifth century, writing on the education of his friend Paula's granddaughter, advised that she "beware of all apocrypha and, if ever she might wish to read it not for the truth of doctrines but for the reverence of miracles, let her know that they were not written by those to whom they are ascribed, and that many vile things have been mixed in and that they require great prudence to find the gold in the filth."'05 Some decades later, disabused of the strict notions of ascetical status and hierarchy so characteristic of Jerome as well as deployed in the interpretation of texts has become so veiled by the institutionalized order of books that any attempt to claim and articulate that authority-as by Priscillian, through the canonical defense of apocrypha-can be seen only as mendacity and the dark, unspeakable threat of a heretical wolf in orthodox sheepskins.
